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Jurisdiction and Immunity in the ICJ Decision in the Yerodia Case SIR ROBERT Y. JENNINGS* The essential facts of this case are stated in two sentences of the Judgment:
'13 On 11 April 2000 an investigating judge of the Brussels tribunal de première instance " issued an international arrest warrant in absentia" against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator or co-perpetrator, with offences constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols thereto, and with crimes against humanity.
At the time when the arrest warrant was issued Mr. Yerodia was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo.'
There arose three main kinds of questions for the Court: whether the Court had jurisdiction over the case and if it had jurisdiction whether the case was admissible; then the nature and extent of the claimed immunity; and finally, if there had been a breach of an immunity, what ought Belgium to be required to do about it? These will be looked at in that order.
Jurisdiction of the Court and the question of admissibility
Both the parties had made declarations under the so-called optional clause of Article 38 of the Court's Statute. Belgium discovered four grounds upon which it hoped to persuade the Court to deny jurisdiction or to deny the admissibility of the case. The Court rejected all these pleas, with only one vote against (Judge Oda in a dissenting Opinion had his own characteristic grounds for voting against each and every decision of the Court in the case).
There is no space here to describe these decisions on the four preliminary objections (see paragraphs 23-44 of the Judgment). Comment is therefore limited to an expression of disappointment that Belgium decided, in a case of great substantive interest and importance, to indulge in these arguments about jurisdiction.
Whether the Belgian warrant was in breach of the immunities enjoyed by the Foreign Minister of the Congo who was at the time in office
The question is virtually answered in the first paragraph (51) of this part of the Judgment which reads:
'51. The Court would observe at the outset that in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of highranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal. For the purposes of the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that fall for the Court to consider'
The Judgment then calls attention to certain treaty instruments (the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961; to which both Belgium and the Congo are parties; though they are not to the New York Convention on Special Missions of 1969); but although these provided useful guidance they did not deal specifically with Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, it was on the basis of customary international law that the Court must decide.
In customary international law it was clear that the immunities granted to Foreign Ministers were not for their personal benefit, 'but to ensure the effective performance of their functions, on behalf of their States (paragraph 53). In such performance 'he or she is frequently required to travel internationally, and thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the need should arise'. 'The Court accordingly concludes (paragraph 54) that the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties'. The Court also firmly rejected any qualification on the ground of a supposed distinction between 'official capacity' and a 'private capacity'. An impediment to the exercise of official functions was ' equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the time of the arrest, present in the territory of the arresting State on an "official" visit or a "private" visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an "official" capacity or a "private" capacity.' Moreover the mere risk of arrest might deter from travelling.
The Court then turned to a Belgian argument that the immunities 'can in no case protect' Ministers 'where they are suspected of having committed war crimes
